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Introduction 
     Averroes discusses the metaphysics of human epistemology extensively.1 Several of his 
works, most prominently his three commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima, attempt to explain 
how finite, particular minds interact with universal, eternal intelligibles.2 These three 
commentaries are named (according their lengths): the Short Commentary, the Middle 
Commentary, and the Long Commentary. Current scholarship focuses on the two longer 
commentaries, likely because the Short Commentary is too short to provide ground for 
discussion and does not articulate Averroes’ mature position on the metaphysics of human 
epistemology. There is no consensus as to which of the two longer commentaries presents 
Averroes’ final articulation of the metaphysics of human epistemology.3 Those who maintain 
that Averroes wrote the Middle Commentary last tend to minimize the differences between the 
two accounts.4 This paper does not take a position on the chronology of Averroes’ works. Rather, 
it seeks to demonstrate that, even if Averroes wrote the Middle Commentary last, the accounts of 
the metaphysics of human epistemology in the Middle and Long commentaries differ 
substantively. 
                                                 
1 A version of this paper first appeared in Dialogue Vol. 59, No. 2-3, pages 269-273.  
 
2 Richard Taylor, “Averroes: Religious Dialectic and Aristotelian Philosophical Thought,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 190. 
 
3 Richard Taylor, Averroes, 190-192; Alfred Ivry. “Averroes’ Middle and Long Commentaries on the ‘De 
anima’,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy: A Historical Journal 5, no. 1 (1995). 
 
4 Alfred Ivry, introduction to Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, trans. Alfred Ivry (Provo: 
Bringham Young University Press, 2002), xvii. 
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The Dispute on Chronology and its Implications 
     Most scholars who publish on Averroes’ metaphysics of epistemology either assume or argue 
that the Middle Commentary was written before the Long Commentary and that these accounts 
differ substantively.5 However, one of the leading scholars in the field, Alfred Ivry, compellingly 
argues that textual evidence indicates the Middle Commentary was composed after the Long 
Commentary.6 In the introduction to his translation of the Middle Commentary, Ivry describes 
the Middle Commentary as an overview, written for lay-people, where Averroes simplifies the 
concepts he expounds upon more fully in the Long Commentary.7 Ivry does not deny that the 
Middle and Long commentaries contain differences, but he minimizes their significance.8 He 
writes: “In the Middle Commentary, Averroes discreetly shows in various ways that he is aware 
of his own social and political context. He has presumably wrestled the text to the ground to his 
own satisfaction, and is now prepared to present it to a wider audience, in an abridged and more 
‘politically correct’ format.”9 Ivry explains that when he mentions social and political pressure 
he is suggesting that Averroes sought to accommodate to Islamic conservatism when he wrote 
the Middle Commentary.10 The question is, Are the differences between the Middle and Long 
                                                 
5 Taylor, Averroes, 190-192; Deborah Black, “Conjunction and the Identity of the Knower and Known in 
Averroes,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73, no. 1 (Winter 1999), accessed October 7, 2016, 
http://rx9vh3hy4r.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-
8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajo
urnal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Conjunction+and+the+identity+of+knower+and+known+in+Averroes&rft.jtitle=
AMERICAN+CATHOLIC+PHILOSOPHICAL+QUARTERLY&rft.au=Black%2C+DL&rft.date=1999&rft.pub=A
MER+CATHOLIC+PHILOSOPHICAL+ASSOC&rft.issn=1051-3558&rft.eissn=2153-
8441&rft.volume=73&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=159&rft.epage=184&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=00
0081438700007. 
 
6 Ivry, Averroes’ Middle and Long Commenatries. 
 
7 Ivry, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s, xvii. 
 
8 Ivry, Middle Commentary, xvii. 
 
9 Ivry, Averroes’ Middle and Long Commentaries, 86. 
 
10 Ivry, Middle Commentary, xxvi. 
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commentaries substantive, or are they explained by Ivry’s theory of abridgement, simplification, 
and political and religious correctness? This question will be answered by surveying each 
account individually and comparing the two accounts in light of their political and religious 
context. 
Averroes Position in the Long Commentary 
          Two concerns drive Averroes’ discussion of the metaphysics of human epistemology in 
the Long Commentary on De Anima: 1) the nature of the theoretical intelligibles and 2) the 
nature of the material intellect.11 These two concerns play out in three questions: a) Are the 
intelligibles generable and corruptible or eternal?, b) How can the material intellect be one while 
numerous people actualize intelligibles in it?, and c) If the material intellect is neither prime 
matter nor form, what is its nature?12 He frames this discussion by describing the material 
intellect as: “That which is potentially all intentions . . . of the universal material forms, but it is 
not any of the beings in act before it itself intellects [any of them].”13 It is important to note that 
this description does not include any mention of the soul. 
     Averroes explores two possibilities regarding the relationship between human minds and the 
material intellect. The first is that each particular person possesses his own material intellect. 
Averroes rejects this possibility because, among other things, this would imply that no two 
people can grasp the same truth.14 The intelligibles received by two different individuals could 
be related, but could not actually be identical. However, it is apparent that, when two people 
                                                 
11 Taylor, Averroes, 192. 
 
12 Ibn Rushd, “Long Commentary on the Soul: Book III,” in Classical Arabic Philosophy, ed. and trans. 
Jon McGinnis and David Reisman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007), 342. 
 
13 Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 335-336. 
 
14 Taylor, Averroes, 192. 
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grasp a truth (for example, 2 + 2 = 4), they are grasping the same truth, not just similar truths. 
Thus, it does not seem possible that the material intellect is particular to each individual.  
     The second possibility is that the material intellect is universal for all intellecting beings. 
Averroes reasons that, if all humans are linked to the same material intellect, then, if one person 
actualizes an intelligible, all persons, due to their connection with the same material intellect, 
would also receive this intelligible. Because it is clear that one person can grasp an intelligible 
without all other people grasping that intelligible, Averroes rejects the possibility that there is 
one material intellect conjoined to all humans.15  
     Averroes resolves these difficulties by positing that: “Obviously a man does not actually 
intellect except because of the conjunction of the actually intelligible with him.”16 This actual 
intelligible must be one matter-form (he uses these terms analogously) unit. Thus, the 
conjunction of a person with this actual intelligible can occur either through the aspect of this 
actual intelligible which is like matter (the material intellect)—a possibility which he has already 
ruled out through the reductio ad absurdum arguments outlined above—or through the aspect 
which is like form, the imagined intentions. The imagined intentions are particular to each 
individual, but can be actualized by the Active Intellect, and made to be “actual movers”17 of the 
material intellect. Throughout the Long Commentary Averroes portrays the Active Intellect as 
independent and separate from the particular human. This reading is supported by the translator’s 
decision to capitalize the term, “Active Intellect” in the Long Commentary. 
                                                 
15 Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 344. 
 
16 Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 345. 
 
17 Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 346. 
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     Thus, Averroes answers the three questions above: a) The actual intelligibles are generable 
and corruptible only to the extent they are related to the imagined intentions.18 b) The material 
intellect can be one while numerous people actualize intelligibles in it because they are not 
conjoined to these actual intelligibles through the material intellect, but rather through the 
imagined intentions.19 c) The material intellect is not form, matter, or the union of the two, but is 
rather a “fourth genus” whose nature is receptivity.20 
Averroes Position in the Middle Commentary 
     Averroes begins his discussion by comparing the views of previous commentators and 
concluding that the material intellect is made up of “of the disposition found in us and of an 
intellect conjoined to this disposition. As conjoined to the disposition, it is a disposed intellect, 
not an intellect in act; though, as not conjoined to this disposition, it is an intellect in act; while, 
in itself, this intellect is the Agent Intellect.”21 In addition to this receptive capacity, the soul also 
possesses the capability to produce intelligibles. This is the capacity which is called “agent.”22 
Throughout The Middle Commentary, Averroes compares the intellect and its reception of 
intelligibles to sense perception. He argues that the rational faculty, unlike the sensory faculties, 
remains unmixed with that which it receives.23 The Agent Intellect, according to this account, 
                                                 
18 Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 343. 
 
19 Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 349. 
 
20 Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 348. 
 
21 Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Trans. Alfred Ivry (Provo: Brigham Young 
University, 2001), 111. 
 
22 Averroes, Middle Commentary, 112. 
 
23 Averroes, Middle Commentary, 113. 
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intellects intelligibles when conjoined with humans and intellects itself when not conjoined to 
humans.24  
The Middle and Long Commentaries Present Differing Accounts 
     The differences between the Long and Middle commentaries on De Anima can be seen in two 
passages. The Long Commentary reads:  
Therefore, to say of the child that he potentially intellects can be understood in two ways: 
one of which is because the imagined forms that are in him are potentially intelligible, 
whereas the second is because the material intellect that naturally receives the intelligible 
of these imagined forms is a potential recipient and potentially conjoined with us.25  
 
Here, while the imagined intentions are associated with a particular person, their being made 
actually intelligible is expressed passively because, as expressed more explicitly elsewhere in the 
Long Commentary, they are only made actually intelligible by an independent (separate from 
individual persons) Active Intellect.26 Additionally, the material intellect is only potentially, not 
necessarily, conjoined to the particular human.  
     A key passage in The Middle Commentary reads: “It is clear that two functions exist in our 
soul, one of which is the producing of intelligibles and the other is the receiving of them. By 
virtue of producing intelligibles, it is called agent, while, by virtue of receiving them, it is called 
passive, though in itself it is one thing.”27 
     These two passages show that Averroes describes both the active and potential intellects 
differently in his two accounts. In the Long Commentary he ascribes the ability to make 
                                                 
24 Averroes, Middle Commentary, 117. 
 
25 Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 345. 
 
26 Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary, 346. 
 
27 Averroes, Middle Commentary, 112. 
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imagined intentions actual intelligibles to a power separate from the particular human, while he 
locates this power within the soul in the Middle Commentary.  
     The contrast is more pronounced with respect to the material intellect. In the Long 
Commentary Averroes speaks of the material intellect as only potentially conjoined to an 
individual. He dedicates a major portion of his argument to establishing that the material intellect 
is a fourth genus, separate from the particular mind and one for all of humanity, whose nature is 
receptivity. But in the Middle Commentary Averroes locates the receptive capacity within the 
particular soul, and rejects the possibility of a substance whose nature is receptivity. He writes: 
“This view [of the other commentators] also entails an absurd position: that there should be a 
separate substance, the existence of which occurs in disposition and potentiality.”28 To avoid this 
absurdity he posits that the material intellect only exists as conjoined to a human.29 
     There are differences in Averroes’ two accounts, not just in individual passages, but also in 
argumentative thrusts. Are these differences substantive or only a result of a shift in how 
Averroes presents his ideas? 
The Differences Between the Middle and Long Commentaries Are Substantive 
     While Ivry’s theories of abridgement and simplification are somewhat plausible (the Middle 
Commentary is both shorter and simpler), they cannot explain away the directly conflicting 
argumentative thrusts of the two works. Moreover, if, as Ivry argues,30 Averroes was influenced 
by a desire to be politically and religiously correct between writing the Middle and Long 
commentaries, he would not have tweaked his account in the way he did. 
                                                 
28 Averroes, Middle Commentary, 111. 
 
29 Averroes, Middle Commentary, 111. 
 
30 Ivry, Middle Cpommentary, xxvi. 
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     If the Long Commentary were composed before the Middle Commentary, then the drift of 
Averroes’ thought would have been against, rather than in accord, with political and religious 
pressure. The religious and political pressure Averroes experienced is epitomized in Averroes’ 
interaction with al-Ghazali, a thinker whom he devoted a whole work to refuting.31 One of the 
major emphasis of al-Ghazali’s religiously conservative thought is a focus on the doctrine of 
divine power and its ensuing total causality.32 If Averroes were going to come more in line with 
this pressure, he would have moved from a position which emphasized particular human 
involvement in the epistemological process in the Long Commentary to one which emphasized 
divine causality in the Middle Commentary. Rather, if Ivry’s chronology is correct, the exact 
opposite is the case. He moves from emphasizing the role of intellects which transcend the 
particular human in the Long Commentary to a portrayal which endows humans with more 
power and involvement in the epistemological process in the Middle Commentary. This move is 
against, rather than in accord with, political and religious pressure, so it seems only a genuine 
conceptual change would lead Averroes to change his portrayal in this way. 
Conclusion 
     Most scholars see real differences between Averroes’ two main treatments of the metaphysics 
of human epistemology. Ivry’s understanding of the order in which Averroes wrote his 
commentaries on De Anima leads him to attempt to explain away the differences between the 
Middle and Long commentaries. He fails in this attempt because his arguments from abridgement 
and simplification are inadequate, and his argument from political and religious pressure 
                                                 
31 Ibn-Rushd. “The Incoherence of the Incoherence: First Discussion,” in Classical Arabic Philosophy, ed. 
and trans. Jon McGinnis and David Reisman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007), 295-308. 
 
32 Michael Marmura, “Al-Ghazali,” in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter 
Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 137-154. 
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highlights, rather than minimizes, the differences between the Middle and Long commentaries. 
The differences between the two accounts are substantive, not superficial. 
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